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Philippine Politics Under Duterte: A Midterm Assessment
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Weinberg, Gerhard L. Werner, Suzanne. Wu, Samuel S. Yuen, Amy. Zagare, Frank C. Marc Kilgour. Perfect Deterrence. However, there are other theories of deterrence based on rational choice that would therefore seem to fall within the umbrella of rational deterrence theory.
The deductions of this model are entirely consistent with the two major propositions of structural deterrence theory as well as with its policy proposals. But as Zagare and Kilgour , ch. Under complete information, wars never occur at all. And when, more likely, information is incomplete, wars occur only under certain specific conditions.
In more elaborate models, Challenger may also possess a threat to retaliate. For the details, see Zagare and Kilgour Powell and Nalebuff are exceptions. A Nash equilibrium, which is the standard measure of rational play in strategic-form games, is any outcome that offers no player an opportunity to induce a better outcome by unilaterally switching to another strategy.
History Law Linguistics Literature. Music Neuroscience Philosophy Physical Sciences. Read More. Back to results. Subscriber sign in. Forgot password? Don't have an account? Sign in via your Institution. Sign in with your library card. Search within Rationality and Deterrence In the previous section we briefly outlined two strands of classical deterrence theory: structural and decision-theoretic.
Empirical Testing While we have focused to this point on the development of deterrence theory, there has also been an extensive empirical literature on deterrence. Theoretical Extensions As we have seen, perfect deterrence theory is both logically consistent and empirically supported. Three-Actor Games Although direct deterrence deals with two states, extended deterrence deals with a minimum of three.
Bargaining and Deterrence Traditional analyses of international relations have modeled decisions as stark choices between two, or sometimes three, alternatives. Identifying Credibility A third important focus of recent theoretical developments has been on identifying credibility. Deterring Terrorism and Civil War The final theoretical extensions we consider here focus on how states can deter terrorism and civil war.
Policy Debates There have been a number of debates regarding deterrence policy over the years.
Find this resource: Google Preview WorldCat. Notes: 1 See also Hastings , Stephen L. Frank C. All rights reserved. Sign in to annotate. Delete Cancel Save. Cancel Save. Procedural rationality. Instrumental rationality. All-out attacks. Strategic stability. Irrational threats. Most users should sign in with their email address. If you originally registered with a username please use that to sign in.
To purchase short term access, please sign in to your Oxford Academic account above. Don't already have an Oxford Academic account? Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University's objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide. Sign In or Create an Account. Sign In. Advanced Search. Article Navigation. Close mobile search navigation Article Navigation. Volume China and the United States: a succession of hegemonies? Oxford Academic.police-risk-management.com/order/store/kebu-dati-cellulare.php
Decline and Fall of China?
Google Scholar. Cite Citation. This is because they have more room to grow. It is harder for hegemons to "grow" when they have already grown and expanded so much. To ensure their preferences, the U. Eventually, Gilpin contends, a dissatisfied great power that approaches the power distribution, approaches the equivalence of the current hegemon will cause a new global war and the cycle repeats.
Generally, the rising challenger does not go on to become the new hegemon as most of their resources have been depleted fighting the hegemon and do not have more to spare to instil their preferences. Instead, some theorists think, a state similar in culture and preferences to the old hegemon will assume new hegemon status. From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. International relations theory Realism.
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This section does not cite any sources. Please help improve this section by adding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. December Learn how and when to remove this template message. International Relations. New York: Pearson-Longman, E-International Relations. Retrieved 7 April The Political Economy of International Relations.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, Webb and Stephen D. Center for International and Development Economics Research. Paper C American Diplomacy. Long Cycles in World Politics. Seattle: University of Washington Press, Joseph News-Press. Archived from the original on Retrieved Seattle: University of Washington Press, , , and Evolution of the World Economy. The limits of hegemonic stability theory. International Organization , 39, pp The World Factbook. Retrieved 26 February The Post-American World.
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