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It allows the doing of good and evil in certain cases, but forbids it in others. I set out the rules comprised by DDE, looking at each in turn with application to examples. Many of the criticisms of the doctrine are based on simple misunderstandings of what it does and does not say, so I provide important clarifications. I also take on some of the more substantive criticisms, showing how the defender of DDE can respond to them. On this view, it is considered an unjust infringement of individual liberty for the state to interfere with individual or group freedom artificially to produce a child.

We argue that AR has implications for the common good, by involving matters of human reproduction, kinship, race, parenthood and identity. In this paper we challenge presuppositions concerning decisional privacy. We examine the essential commodification of human life implicit in AR and the systematicity that makes this possible. After examining objections to the thesis that AR is illegitimate for reasons of public policy and the common good, we return to the issue of decisional privacy in the light of considerations concerning the legitimate role of the state in matters affecting human reproduction.

Athanassoulis ed. Applied ethics is dominated by consequentialist thinking. Other theories, such as rights-based ones, have a lesser presence. Pragmatism is common, usually tied to loose consequentialist ideas. Natural law theory, however, has been conspicuously absent from debate. Genetic engineering is a prime example of a subject to which natural law theory has so far made little contribution. I examine and expose the misunderstandings of the concept of the natural that have led many applied ethicists to think natural law theory discredited.

I outline some key features of the theory, contrasting it with consequentialism, and set out some of the objectionable practices to which the latter is committed when it comes to genetics in general and reproductive technology in particular. I go on to argue that whilst natural law theory cannot rule out all forms of genetic engineering, still it can provide a radical critique of certain kinds of intervention in the natural world based on the distorted manner of living to which many societies and individuals are prone.

Oderberg and T. There are two methodologically distinct but complementary ways of approaching natural law theory. One is a mainly agent-centred approach, focusing on practical reasoning and the intelligibility of action, paying attention to human tendencies and inclinations.

The other, more traditional and mainly world-centred approach, focuses on the metaphysics of the good by means of an analysis of human nature and human faculties, and of the way in which the good must be structured for it to be an object of human pursuit, more specifically, a foundation for moral decision- making. In this paper I take a primarily world-centred approach to fundamental questions of content and structure.

First, looking at some typical examples from natural law theorists of lists of the basic goods, I analyse various members that they have proposed to see what the correct list must contain. Next, I look at questions concerning how the natural law must be structured, in particular whether the list of basic goods is finite, whether there is a supreme or superordinate good, and what kinds of hierarchical relations within and across goods must exist in order for the basic goods to serve as a foundation for practical reasoning about morality.

The general conclusions I draw are, first, that ontology must be taken seriously, and miscategorization avoided, when identifying basic goods; secondly, that the structure of the good requires a system of principles enabling various kinds of comparative judgment within and across goods, in order for natural law theory to serve as a basis for guiding concrete moral decisions. Things change. If anything counts as a datum of metaphysics, that does. Hence any correct theory of persistence must be consistent with the existence of change.

Yet temporal part theory, alias four-dimensionalism, does not satisfy this basic requirement. First I outline the theory in its standard form. I then show why, contra Mark Heller, there can be no argument for temporal parts based on the Indiscernibility of Identicals, which itself presupposes facts of identity rather than grounds them.

Towards a Natural Law Critique of Genetic Engineering | SpringerLink

Nor does David Lewis's so-called 'problem of temporary intrinsics' give any support to four-dimensionalism. As far as the semantics of change goes, I advocate as against adverbialism and relationalism 'sententialism': temporal expressions such as 'at t' or 'from t1 to t2' operate on whole sentences and may not be dropped from sentences expressing change without thereby entailing contradiction.

Finally, although not every argument for the inconsistency of four-dimensionalism and change succeeds, I argue, via a discussion of Lombard and van Inwagen, that there is indeed such an inconsistency: temporal part theory is a replacement theory, whereby nothing ever does, literally, change. O'Hear ed. The ethics of co-operation in another's wrongdoing is an under-explored area of moral philosophy. Yet co-operation is pervasive throughout the world of action and its evaluation is a specialized area of ethics. It is a test of any normative moral theory that it possess the conceptual tools for analysing cases of co-operation and yielding persuasive moral judgments about them.

This paper sets out a theory of co-operation based on traditional moral categories derived from the natural law. First I distinguish kinds of co-operation.

Then I discuss the lawfulness of co-operation, focusing on the crucial distinction between formal and material co-operation. The former is always wrong; the latter is sometimes permissible. Discussion of concrete cases shows how the relevant principles are to be applied. Analysis also reveals that the employment of those principles involves nothing other. That the ethics of co-operation is but a special case of PDE constitutes indirect evidence of the plausibility of double effect reasoning.

Moreover, the subtlety of the questions involved precludes anything like a consequentialist theory's being of any use in solving problems of co-operation. Central to recent debate over the Kalam Cosmological Argument, and over the origin of the universe in general, has been the issue of whether the universe began to exist, and if so how this is to be understood. I conclude with more general metaphysical discussion of the beginning of the universe and of the Kalam Cosmological Argument.

A common argumentative strategy employed by anti-reductionists involves claiming that one kind of entity cannot be identified with or reduced to a second because what can intelligibly be predicated of one cannot be predicated intelligibly of the other.

Oderberg, David S.

For instance, it might be argued that mind and brain are not identical because it makes sense to say that minds are rational but it does not make sense to say that brains are rational. I analyse a possible counterexample to validity and show that it is not conclusive, as it depends on what syntactical construction is given to the premises.

This leads to the general observation that the argument form under consideration works for some constructions but not others, and thus to the conclusion that further analysis of intelligibility is called for before it can be known whether the argumentative strategy is open to the anti-reductionist or not. Here I reply point by point to Graham Oppy's critique of the first part of my paper, 'Traversal of the Infinite, the "Big Bang" and the Kalam Cosmological Argument', arguing that none of his criticisms are sound.

Oderberg', Philosophia Christi 4 The basic argument - that the universe has a cause viz. God because the universe began to exist and whatever begins to exist has a cause of its beginning to exist - has excited vigorous criticism on various fronts. The aim of this paper is twofold: a to survey and evaluate that aspect of the KCA which relies on the claim that the universe as actual infinite cannot be formed by successive addition i. I canvass and refute criticisms of both claims, providing positive arguments to show that the claims are true. On both scores, then, the KCA stands unrefuted.

For all the attention given to the revival of essentialism based on the work of Plantinga, Kripke, Putnam and others, what we have really seen is the coming to prominence of an ontologically thin, unsystematic set of ideas with little theoretical cohesion or metaphysical underpinning, motivated primarily by considerations in modal logic and philosophy of language. I contrast contemporary essentialism of this kind with a metaphysically more robust, neo-Aristotelian or 'real' essentialism which attributes real essences to kinds of object.

After rejecting some common Quinean sceptical arguments against the very idea of de re necessity, I outline and briefly defend three central tenets of real essentialism derived from the relation between: essence and identity; essence and existence; essence and property. I end by locating real essentialism within a broader programme called philosophical traditionalism. I look specifically at attacks on the argument based on the confusion of actual and potential infinity, scepticism about processes, doubt about whether the beginning of the universe can be adequately formulated, and the impossibility of traversing the infinite.

Freedom of belief is one of the entrenched values in modern society. Interpreted as the right not to be coerced into believing something, it is surely correct. But most people take it to mean that there is a right to false belief, a right to be wrong. People think that freedom of thought is a good thing, and this must include the freedom to make mistakes.

It is also often thought that making mistakes is a life-enhancing and essential part of personal development. I argue that these ideas are false.

Human Lives

Beginning with an examination of the basic good of truth, and making comparisons with other goods like health and friendship, I argue that there is a duty to believe only the truth, which thus logically excludes the right also to believe falsehood. I distinguish between the strict wrongness of false belief and the fact that, because of our epistemic limitations , we are not always to be blamed for our false beliefs.

Even in the case of those beliefs which are involuntary, there is no right to have them if they are false, even though we are not to be blamed for having them. The right to be wrong, I conclude, is a modern myth. This paper is a detailed study of what are traditionally called the cardinal virtues: prudence, justice, temperance and fortitude.

I defend what I call the Cardinality Thesis, that the traditional four and no others are cardinal. I define cardinality in terms of three sub-theses, the first being that the cardinal virtues are jointly necessary for the possession of every other virtue, the second that each of the other virtues is a species of one of the four cardinals, and the third that many of the other virtues are also auxiliaries of one or more cardinals.

I provide abstract arguments for each sub-thesis, followed by illustration from concrete cases. I then use these results to shed light on the two fundamental problems of the acquisition of the virtues and their unity, proving some further theses in the latter case. One of the objections raised to the Kalam Cosmological Argument KCA the universe began to exist; whatever begins to exist has a cause of the beginning of its existence; therefore the universe has a cause of the beginning of its existence [which, by further argument, is claimed to be God] is that the universe did not begin to exist.

This paper seeks to refute the notorious charge made by Geach, Urmson et al. Second-order logic is used to show why this is so, and further observations on the nature of the good are made in light of the acquittal of Aristotle. I refute their objections to the claim that the zygote and embryo are individual human beings, which objections are based on phenomena associated with fission, totipotency, cloning, and parthenogenesis.

Once we understand the metaphysics behind such phenomena, we can see that conception is an ontologically special event, contrary to Singer and Kuhse. The moral status of the zygote and embryo is not undermined by the specious metaphysical arguments considered here. Oderberg and J. This paper sets out to answer the question: Does a person who kills another at the latter's request commit an injustice against that person? Defining justice in terms of rights, it is argued that the right to life is inalienable; hence, that voluntary euthanasia is always an injustice by the killer against the killed.

Inalienability is justified in three ways. First, it is shown that there is nothing peculiar in the concept of an inalienable right and that even consequentialism must recognize at least one such right. Secondly, some plausible examples of inalienable rights are considered and a purported refutation of inalienability based on the analogy with property rights is dismissed.

Thirdly, a positive account is outlined, according to which the right to life is seen as fundamental to a theory of human good. Secondly, the Substance Thesis is elaborated and a failed attempt to refute it is discussed. Thirdly, the thesis is shown not to be refuted by cases called Leibnizian of coinciding, ontologically dependent objects.

Fourthly, it is shown in terms of discussion of key examples why coincidence is impossible for substances. The natural law is one of the most enduring of philosophical traditions. By insisting that normativity is based on how things are in fact, the natural law tradition avoids the relativistic implications of the idea that morality is wholly By insisting that normativity is based on how things are in fact, the natural law tradition avoids the relativistic implications of the idea that morality is wholly based in features of man's making, whether consensus, feeling, emotion, social construction, convention, performative utterances or human methodology.

It promises the possibility of arriving at moral truths by reference to truths of ontology and a metaphysics that is comprehen-sible to human reason. In this, the natural law tradition arguably offers a secure foundation for an understanding of right and wrong, good and evil, virtue and vice, and the common good. Although there are bound to be grey areas and borderline cases in the moral domain, the strength of the natural law approach is most evident where paradigms are concerned.

In this paper we consider four ethical paradigms: genocide, disproportionate punishment e. Ethical dialogue often repairs to clear cases like these when wholesale doubt threatens dominion. Such examples are typically used to sharpen moral concepts, locate ethical limits and explore moral reasoning. I say these are paradigms of wrongdoing not because I want to presuppose the truth of what I am claiming but because these kinds of examples are typically the sort that might be raised in any meta-ethical dialogue.

The examples explore the possibility of objectivity in moral reasoning, the rational limits on human freedom, the proper teleological understanding of humans and their place in the world, and a catalogue of other conceptual apparatus traditionally. View on goo. Save to Library. The Natural Law Tradition has been at the very heart of western ethical, political and jurisprudential development.

The purpose of the present volume is to collect together a representative and wide-ranging series of readings which fall The purpose of the present volume is to collect together a representative and wide-ranging series of readings which fall within the auspices of the oldest and historically most authoritative of these and takes the discussion into the modern world with readings in metaphysics, jurisprudence, politics and ethics. This project, drawing upon the metaphysical and ethical categories most famously stated and developed by Aristotle and Aquinas, has at its core a vision of human nature, both as individual and social, material and immaterial.

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An exciting foray into the foundations of Western civilisation, the readings offer the reader a focal point for discussion surrounding the natural law tradition. View on jacquelinelaing. This book aims to redress the imbalance in moral philosophy created by the dominance of consequentialism and utilitarianism, the view that criterion of morality is the maximisation of good effects over bad without regard to intrinsic This book aims to redress the imbalance in moral philosophy created by the dominance of consequentialism and utilitarianism, the view that criterion of morality is the maximisation of good effects over bad without regard to intrinsic rightness or wrongness.

This approach has become the orthodoxy over the last few decades particularly in bioethics, where moral theory is applied to bioethics. Human Lives critically examines the assumptions and arguments of consequentialism reviviing in the process such concepts as rights, justice, innocence, natural integrity, flourishing, the virtues and the fundamental value of human life.

View on books. Comparative law demonstrates that positive laws often enthusiastically championed as progressive, forward-thinking and socially useful turn out, upon analysis, to be no such thing. The twentieth century is nothing if not a reminder of Among those groups targeted for oppression typically are the young, the poor, the dissident, alcoholics, addicts, the unemployed and the disabled. Millions have been slaughtered and oppressed for their ethnicity, creed, race, social grouping, medical inheritance, sexuality and political views.

Comparative legal history highlights human capacity for wrongdoing particularly when laws, institutions and public attitudes normalise injustice. This analysis suggests that the practice of eugenics has not disappeared. Conceptually related to the utilitarian and social Darwinist worldview and historically evolving out of the practice of slavery, it has led to some of the most spectacular human rights abuses in history. The sterilization of and experimentation on those deemed disadvantageous in many technologically developed states like the US, Scandinavia, and Japan, led inexorably and most systematically to Nazi Germany with the elimination of countless millions.

It was this very idea operating in conjunction with the idea that the end justifies the means that drove much of the injustice of the twentieth century. The new eugenics with its continuing commitment to what I have called repro- and necro-eugenics, I suggest, fares no better and spells disaster for physically, socially or politically at risk groups. The idea that the better outcome could by virtue of being freely chosen avoid the charge of injustice is implausible.

Schemes like genocide could also be achieved by willing participants using effective marketing techniques, law reform and altered mindsets. Spencer, London, more. An examination of the connection between law and justice in the natural law tradition. Insights into Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Augustine and Aquinas and the critics of the classical natural law tradition. According to these related ideas, human beings achieve their moral status in virtue of the degree to which they are According to these related ideas, human beings achieve their moral status in virtue of the degree to which they are capable of laying value upon their lives or exhibiting certain qualities or being desirable to third party family members.

This article challenges these criteria suggesting that these and related ideas are predicated on arbitrary and discriminatory notions of human moral status. Our abilities, age and desirability can and do fluctuate. The equal dignity principle, distinguished in turn from both the excesses of vitalism and consequentialism, is analyzed and defended in the context of human rights logic and law.

The normalization of non- and involuntary euthanasia, via such emerging practices as the self-styled Groningen Protocol is considered. Substituted consent to the euthanasia of babies and others is scrutinized and the implications of institutionalizing non-voluntary euthanasia in the context of financial, research and political interests are considered. The impact on the medical and legal professions, carers, families and societies, as well as public attitudes more generally, is discussed. It is suggested that eroding the value of human life carries with it significant destructive long-term implications.

To elevate some often short-term implications whilst ignoring others demonstrates the irrational nature of the effort to institutionalize euthanasia. More Info: J Med Ethics ; doi View on jme. The age of austerity, targetised bed-clearing and a costly The age of austerity, targetised bed-clearing and a costly ageing population are reason enough for concern. Managerialising Death more. View on lawgazette. Incentivising Death Solicitors Journal 9 more. More Info: Solicitors Journal 9. A Lethal Power? Only a year later hospitals, care homes and hospices in Only a year later hospitals, care homes and hospices in England had rolled out the programme.

However useful the Pathway may be in individual cases properly applied, incentivised and managerialised death targets become problematic in the context of uncertain diagnosis, a steadily ageing population, spiralling healthcare costs, and the philosophical dehumanisation of the vulnerable pervasive in contemporary bioethics. As such, they predictably invite and rationalise grave human rights abuse with tragic consequences for the defenceless incapacitated in hospitals and care homes.

Applied Ethics , Medical Ethics , and Euthanasia. View on newlawjournal. Not in my name New Law Journal, , 81 more. Laing argues that institutionalizing medically assisted death - erodes respect for human life and is intrinsically discriminatory. Arguing that it plays into the hands of illicit interests and underestimates human capacity for vice, she Arguing that it plays into the hands of illicit interests and underestimates human capacity for vice, she suggests that it trades on an improper understanding of human autonomy. More Info: Laing, Jacqueline A. The experience of the twentieth century bears witness to the abuse, mutilation and homicide of the vulnerable made possible by the power of the state, mass markets, and medical and financial interests.

Suggestions for reform of the law With the Western world undergoing massive demographic change and a growing ageing and non-productive population, it cannot be assumed that these alterations to the positive law are problem-free. By allowing new agents power to require that food and fluids be withdrawn, non-therapeutic research and other procedures like abortion and sterilisation be performed on non-consenting patients, novel legislation such as that discussed cannot be regarded as autonomy enhancing so much as a threat to human rights.

These laws although touted as progressive, more often than not invite routine abuse and destruction of the vulnerable, obscure accountability and create an inconsistent body of law, with conflicting obligations for health professionals. Tollefsen, ed. Philosophy of Medicine. View on thomasmoreinstitute. The Mental Capacity Bill Human rights concerns more.

The Mental Capacity Bill, the author argues, endangers the vulnerable by inviting serious human rights abuse.

These grave deficiencies prompted the warnings of the 23rd Report of the Joint Committee on Human Rights highlighting the These grave deficiencies prompted the warnings of the 23rd Report of the Joint Committee on Human Rights highlighting the proposed legislation's failure to supply adequate safeguards against Articles 2, 3, 8 and 14 incompatibilities. Arguably also a responsibility shifting exercise, the legislation endangers those who cannot speak for themselves by permitting financial, medical and research interests to override fundamental human rights to life, liberty, dignity and freedom.

Most alarmingly of all, efforts to permit non-therapeutic research on the non-consenting vulnerable as well as non-consensual sterilization and abortion, suggest that the legislation heralds a new era of gross human rights abuse in institutions around the UK. More Info: "Jacqueline A. Family Law.

tilorati.tk View on jordanpublishing. On the Wrong Track Solicitors Journal The House of Lords in Purdy forced the Director of Public Prosecutions to issue offence-specific guidance on assisted suicide, but Jacqueline Laing argues that the resulting interim policy adopted by the Director of Public Prosecutions The House of Lords in Purdy forced the Director of Public Prosecutions to issue offence-specific guidance on assisted suicide, but Jacqueline Laing argues that the resulting interim policy adopted by the Director of Public Prosecutions is unconstitutional, discriminatory and illegal.


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More Info: Jacqueline A. Laing On the Wrong Track. Solicitors Journal View on solicitorsjournal. Artificial reproduction, blood relatedness, and human identity The Monist: International Journal of General Philosophical Enquiry 89, The article discusses the significance of blood relatedness in the context of identity arguments about artificial reproduction AR. Kinship, origins, and biological connections are significant to human beings.

The author explains that The author explains that family relationships bear on the identity of human beings. Moreover, she emphasizes that once these principles are neglected, it is possible to create people in ways that threaten significant human bonds and alienate people who are naturally related spelling loss, confusion and grief for them. View on pdcnet. Information technology and biometric databases: Eugenics and other threats to disability rights more. The author contends that the practice of eugenics has not disappeared.

Conceptually related to the utilitarian and Social Darwinist worldview and historically evolving out of the practice of slavery, it led to some of the most spectacular Conceptually related to the utilitarian and Social Darwinist worldview and historically evolving out of the practice of slavery, it led to some of the most spectacular human rights abuses in human history.